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We show that under some general conditions the finite memory determinacy of a class of
two-player win/lose games played on finite graphs implies the existence of a Nash equilibrium
built from finite memory strategies for the corresponding class of multi-player multi-outcome
games. This generalizes a previous result by Brihaye, De Pril and Schewe. We provide a
number of example that separate the various criteria we explore.
Our proofs are generally constructive, that is, provide upper bounds for the memory
required, as well as algorithms to compute the relevant Nash equilibria.
1 Introduction
The usual model employed for synthesis are sequential two-player win/lose games played on finite
graphs. The vertices of the graph correspond to states of a system, and the two players jointly
generate an infinite path through the graph (the run). One player, the protagonist, models the
aspects of the system under the control of the designer. In particular, the protagonist will win
the game iff the run satisfies the intended specification. The other player is assumed to be fully
antagonistic, thus wins iff the protagonist loses. One then would like to find winning strategies
of the protagonist, that is, a strategy for her to play the game in such a way that she will win
regardless of the antagonist’s moves. Particularly desirable winning strategies are those which
can be executed by a finite automaton.
Classes of games are distinguished by the way the winning conditions (or more generally,
preferences of the players) are specified. Typical examples include:
• Muller conditions, where only the set of vertices visited infinitely many times matters;
• Parity conditions, where each vertex has a priority, and the winner is decided by the parity
of the least priority visited infinitely many times;
• Energy conditions, where each vertex has an energy delta (positive or negative), and the
protagonist loses if the cumulative energy values ever drop below 0;
• Discounted payoff conditions, where each vertex has a payoff value, and the outcome is
determined by the discounted sum of all payoffs visited with some discount factor 0 < λ <
1;
• Combinations of these, such as energy parity games, where the protagonist has to simul-
taneously ensure that the least parity visited infinitely many times is odd and that the
cumulative energy value is never negative.
2 Extending finite memory determinacy
Our goal is to dispose of two restrictions of this setting: First, we would like to consider any
number of players; and second allow them to have far more complicated preferences than just
preferring winning over losing. The former generalization is crucial in a distributed setting (also
e.g. [4, 6]): If different designers control different parts of the system, they may have different
specifications they would like to enforce, which may be partially but not entirely overlapping.
The latter seems desirable in a broad range of contexts. Indeed, rarely is the intention for
the behaviour of a system formulated entirely in black and white: We prefer a programm just
crashing to accidently erasing our hard-drive; we prefer a programm to complete its task in 1
minute to it taking 5 minutes, etc. We point to [15] for a recent survey on such notions of quality
in synthesis.
Rather than achieving this goal by revisiting each individual type of game and proving
the desired results directly (e.g. by generalizing the original proofs of the existence of winning
strategies), we shall provide two transfer theorems: In both Theorem 8 and Theorem 12, we will
show that (under some conditions), if the two-player win/lose version of a game is finite-memory
determined, the corresponding multi-player multi-outcome games all have finite-memory Nash
equilibria. The difference is that Theorem 8 refers to all games played on finite graphs using
certain preferences, whereas Theorem 12 refers to one fixed graph only.
Theorem 12 is more general than a similar one obtained by Brihaye, De Pril and Schewe
[4],[23, Theorem 4.4.14]. A particular class of games covered by our result but not the previous
one are (a variant of) energy parity games as introduced by Chatterjee and Doyen [8]. The
high-level proof idea follows earlier work by the authors on equilibria in infinite sequential games,
using Borel determinacy as a blackbox [17]1 – unlike the constructions there (cf. [18]), the present
ones however are constructive and thus give rise to algorithms computing the equilibria in the
multi-player multi-outcome games given suitable winning strategies in the two-player win/lose
versions.
The general theme of transferring determinacy results from antagonistic two-player games
to the existence of Nash equilibria in multiplayer games is already present in [24] by Thuijsman
and Raghavan, as well as [12] by Gra¨del and Ummels.
Echoing De Pril in [23], we would like to stress that our conditions apply to the preferences
of each player individually. For example, some players could pursue energy parity conditions,
whereas others have preferences based on Muller conditions: Our results apply just as they
would do if all players had preferences of the same type.
This article extends and supersedes the earlier [19] which appeared in the proceedings of
Strategic Reasoning 2016.
Structure of the paper: After introducing notation and the basic concepts in Section 2,
we state our two main theorems in Section 3. The proofs of our main theorems are given in
the form of several lemmata in Section 4. The lemmata prove slightly more than required for
the theorems, and might be of independent interest for some readers. In Section 5 we discuss
how our results improve upon prior work, and explore several notions prominent in our main
theorems in some more detail. Finally, in Section 6 we consider as applications two classes of
games covered by our main theorems but not by previous work.
1Precursor ideas are also present in [16] and [20] (the specific result in the latter was joint work with Neymann).
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2 Background
Win/lose two-player games: A win/lose two-player game played on a finite graph is spec-
ified by a directed graph (V,E) where every vertex has an outgoing edge, a starting vertex
v0 ∈ V , two sets V1 ⊆ V and V2 := V \ V1, a function Γ : V → C coloring the vertices, and
a winning condition W ⊆ Cω. Starting from v0, the players move a token along the graph, ω
times, with player a ∈ {1, 2} picking and following an outgoing edge whenever the current vertex
lies in Va. Player 1 wins iff the infinite sequence of the colors seen (at the visited vertices) is in
W .
Winning strategies: For a ∈ {1, 2} let Ha be the set of finite paths in (V,E) starting at v0
and ending in Va. Let H := H1 ∪H2 be the possible finite histories of the game, and let [H] be
the infinite ones. For clarity we may write [Hg] instead of [H] for a game g. A strategy of player
a ∈ {1, 2} is a function of type Ha → V such that (v, s(hv)) ∈ E for all hv ∈ Ha. A pair of
strategies (s1, s2) for the two players induces a run ρ ∈ V
ω: Let s := s1 ∪ s2 and set ρ(0) := v0
and ρ(n + 1) := s(ρ(0)ρ(1) . . . ρ(n)). For all strategies sa of player a let H(sa) be the finite
histories in H that are compatible with sa, and let [H(sa)] be the infinite ones. Every sequence
v0v1v2 . . . of vertices naturally induces a color trace Γ(v0v1v2 . . . ) := Γ(v0)Γ(v1)Γ(v2) . . . . A
strategy sa is said to be winning if Γ[[H(sa)]] ⊆ W , i.e. a wins regardless of her opponent’s
moves. A game where either of the players has a winning strategy is called determined.
Finite-memory strategies: A strategic update for player a using m bits of memory is a
function σ : V ×{0, 1}m → V ×{0, 1}m that describes the two simultaneous updates of player a
upon arrival at a vertex v if its memory content wasM just before arrival: (v,M) 7→ π2◦σ(v,M)
describes the memory update and (v,M) 7→ π1 ◦ σ(v,M) the choice for the next vertex. This
choice will be ultimately relevant only if v ∈ Va, in which case we require that (v, π1 ◦σ(v,M)) ∈
E.
A strategic update together with an initial memory content Mǫ ∈ {0, 1}
m is called a strategic
implementation. The memory content after some history is defined by induction: Mσ(Mǫ, ǫ) :=
Mǫ and Mσ(Mǫ, hv) := π2 ◦ σ(v,Mσ(Mǫ, h)) for all hv ∈ H. A strategic update σ together
with initial memory content Mǫ induce a finite-memory strategy sa defined by sa(hv) := π1 ◦
σ(v,Mσ(Mǫ, h)) for all hv ∈ Ha. In a slight abuse we may call strategic implementation finite-
memory strategies. If not stated otherwise, we will assume the initial memory to be 0m.
Multi-outcome multi-player games and Nash equilibria: A (general) game played on a
finite graph is specified by a directed graph (V,E), a set of agents A, a cover {Va}a∈A of V via
pairwise disjoint sets, the starting vertex v0, a function Γ : V → C coloring the vertices, and for
each player a a preference relation2 ≺a ⊆ Γ[[H]]× Γ[[H]] (or more generously ≺a ⊆ C
ω × Cω).
We overload the notation by also writing ρ ≺a ρ
′ if Γ(ρ) ≺a Γ(ρ′) for all ρ, ρ′ ∈ [H], i.e. players
compare runs by comparing their color traces. The two-player games with inverse preferences
(≺2 = ≺
−1
1 ) are called antagonistic games, and they generalize win/lose two-player games.
The notions of strategies and induced runs generalize in the obvious way. In particular,
instead of a pair of strategies (one per player), we consider families (sa)a∈A, which are called
2Note that we do not understand preferences to automatically be total or satisfy other specific properties.
From Definition 3 onwards we will restrict our attention to strict weak orders though.
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strategy profiles. The concept of a winning strategy no longer applies though. Instead, we
use the more general notion of a Nash equilibrium: A family of strategies (sa)a∈A is a Nash
equilibrium, if there is no player a0 ∈ A and strategy s
′
a0
such that a0 would prefer the run
induced by (sa)a∈A\{a0} ∪ (s
′
a)a∈{a0} to the run induced by (sa)a∈A. Intuitively, no player can
gain by unilaterally deviating from a Nash equilibrium. Note that the Nash equilibria in two-
player win/lose games are precisely those pairs of strategy where one strategy is a winning
strategy.
Threshold games and future games: Our results, including transfer from the two-player
win/lose case to the general case, rely on the idea that each general game induces a collection
of two-player win/lose games, namely the threshold games of the future games, as below.
Definition 1 (Future game and one-vs-all threshold game).
Let g = 〈(V,E), v0, A, {Va}a∈A, (≺a)a∈A〉 be a game played on a finite graph.
• For a0 ∈ A and ρ ∈ [H], the one-vs-all threshold game ga0,ρ for a0 and ρ is the win-lose
two-player game played on (V,E), starting at v0, with vertex subsets Va0 and
⋃
a∈A\{a0} Va,
and with winning set {ρ′ ∈ [H] | ρ ≺a0 ρ′} for Player 1.
• Let v ∈ V . For paths hv and vh′ in (V,E) let hvˆ vh′ := hvh′.
• For all h ∈ H with last vertex v let gh := 〈(V,E), v, A, {Va}a∈A, (≺ha)a∈A〉 be called the
future game of g after h, where for all ρ, ρ′ ∈ [Hgh ] we set ρ ≺ha ρ′ iff hˆ ρ ≺a hˆ ρ′. If s is a
strategy in g, let sh be the strategy in gh such that sh(h′) := s(hˆ h′) for all h′ ∈ Hgh .
Observation 2. Let g = 〈(V,E), v0, A, {Va}a∈A, (≺a)a∈A〉 be a game played on a finite graph.
1. g and its thresholds games have the same strategies.
2. for all h, h′ ∈ H ending with the same vertex the games gh and gh′ have the same (finite-
memory) strategies.
3. g, its future games, and their thresholds games have the same strategic implementations.
4. If a strategy sa in g is finite-memory, for all h ∈ H the strategy s
h
a is also finite-memory.
Proof. We only prove the fourth claim. Since sa is a finite-memory strategy, it comes from
some strategic implementation (σ,Mǫ). We argue that (σ,Mσ(Mǫ, h))) is a strategic implemen-
tation for shva : First, s
hv
a (v) = sa(hv) = π1 ◦ σ(v,Mσ(Mǫ, h)) = π1 ◦ σ(v,Mσ(Mσ(Mǫ, h), ǫ));
second, for all h′v′ ∈ Hhv we have shva (vh′v′) = sa(hvh′v′) = π1 ◦ σ(v′,Mσ(Mǫ, hvh′)) =
π1 ◦ σ(v
′,Mσ(Mσ(Mǫ, h), vh′)).
Our (transfer) results rely on players having winning strategies that are implementable with
uniformly finite memory, so that for every game they may be picked from a finite set of strategies.
The following (shortenable) shorthands will be useful. Let g be a game, let a be a player.
• Let m ∈ N be such that in all threshold games for a in g, if player a has a winning strategy,
she has one that is implementable using m bits of memory. Then we say that player a
wins her winnable threshold games in g using uniformly finite memory m.
• Let m ∈ N be such that all (future) threshold games for a in g have finite-memory winning
strategies that are implementable using m bits of memory. Then we say that the (future)
threshold games for a in g are uniformly-finite-memory determined using m bits.
Note that speaking about future games above is the more general statement, as we prefix some
finite history, and the sufficient memory depends on neither the threshold nor the history (cf
Example ??).
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Strict weak orders: The concepts so far are well-defined for preferences that are arbitrary
binary relations. However, our results rely on the preferences being strict weak orders, as
defined below, and all the preferences in the remainder of this article are assumed to be strict
weak orders.
Definition 3 (Strict weak order). Recall that a relation ≺ is called a strict weak order if it
satisfies:
∀x, ¬(x ≺ x)
∀x, y, z, x ≺ y ∧ y ≺ z ⇒ x ≺ z
∀x, y, z, ¬(x ≺ y) ∧ ¬(y ≺ z) ⇒ ¬(x ≺ z)
Strict weak orders capture in particular the situation where each player cares only about a
particular aspect of the run (e.g. her associated personal payoff), and is indifferent between runs
that coincide in this aspect but not others (e.g. the runs with identical associated payoffs for
her, but different payoffs for the other players). We will show in Subsection 6.2 that considering
strict weak orders is strictly more general than working with payoff functions only.
Guarantees Definition 4 below rephrases Definitions 2.3 and 2.5 from [16]: Given a strategy
of a player a, the guarantee consists of the compatible runs plus the runs that are, according to
≺a, not worse than all the compatible runs. The guarantee is thus upper-closed w.r.t. ≺a. The
best guarantee is the intersection of all the guarantees, and is thus also upper-closed.
Definition 4 (Player (best) future guarantee). Let g be the game
〈(V,E), v0, A, {Va}a∈A, (≺a)a∈A〉 and let a ∈ A. For all h ∈ H and strategies sa for a in gh let
γa(h, sa) := {ρ ∈ [Hgh ] | ∃ρ
′ ∈ [Hgh(sa)], ¬(ρ ≺ha ρ′)} be the player future guarantee by sa in
gh. Let Γa(h) :=
⋂
sa
γa(h, sa) be the best future guarantee of a in g
h. We write γa(sa) and Γa
when h is the trivial history.
Note that in general the best guarantee may be empty, but our assumptions will (indirectly)
rule this out: they will imply that each player has indeed a strategy realizing her best guarantee,
i.e. a strategy sa with Γa = γa(sa).
In Example 5 we construct a Nash equilibrium by starting with a strategy profile where
everyone is realizing their guarantee, and then adding punishments against any deviators. The
idea behind this construction is one ingredient of our results.
Example 5. Let the underlying graph be as in Figure 1, where circle vertices are controlled by
Player 1 and diamond vertices are controlled by Player 2. The preference relation of Player 1
is (ab)ω ≻1 a(ba)
nxω ≻1 (ab)
nyω and the preference relation of Player 2 is (ab)ω ≻2 (ab)
nyω ≻2
a(ba)nxω (in particular, both players care only about the tail of the run).
Then Γ1(a) = {(ab)
ω}∪{a(ba)nxω | n ∈ N} and Γ2(a) = [H]. Player 1 realizing her guarantee
means for her to move to x immediately, thus forgoing any chance of realizing the run (ab)ω. The
Nash equilibrium constructed in the proof of both Theorem 8 and Theorem 12 will be Player
1 moving to x and Player 2 moving to y. Note that in this particular game, the preference of
Player 2 has no impact at all on the Nash equilibrium that will be constructed.
Note that the notion of best guarantee for a player does not at all depend on the preferences of
the other players; and as such, it is a bit strenuous to consider a strategy realizing the guarantee
(or the minimal runs therein) to be optimal in the game at hand (cf. Example 5). This strategy
is rather optimal for a player that would play against a coalition of antagonistic opponents, and
thus makes sense based on a worst-case assumption about the behaviour of the other players.
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astart b
x y
Figure 1: The game for Example 5
Optimality Strategies may be optimal (in a weak sense as discussed above) either at the
beginning of the game or at all histories. This useful game-theoretic concept is rephrased below
in terms of best guarantee.
Definition 6. Let sa be a strategy for some player a in some game g.
• sa is optimal, if γa(sa) = Γa.
• sa is optimal at history h ∈ H, if s
h
a is optimal in g
h.
• sa is subgame-optimal, if it is optimal at all h ∈ H.
• sa is consistent-optimal, if it is optimal at all h ∈ H(sa).
Note that the notion of optimality is orthogonal to that of determinacy. Especially, the
players having optimal strategies does not imply determinacy of the derived threshold games
(in an undetermined win/lose game, the guarantee of both players is the set of all runs – hence,
any strategy is optimal).
The key Lemma 24 essentially consists in a quantifier inversion, like the one in [17]. Assuming
that for all histories there is a finite-memory optimal strategy, we will use them to construct a
finite-memory strategy that is subgame-optimal. To know when to use which strategy, we will
use the assumption that optimality of a given strategy at an arbitrary history can be decided
regularly.
Definition 7. A player a in a game g has the optimality is regular (OIR) property, if for all
finite-memory strategies sa for a in g, there exists a finite automaton that decides on input
h ∈ H whether or not sa is optimal at h.
A game g has the OIR property, if all the players have it in g.
A preference has the optimality is regular property, if players with this preference have the
OIR in all games.
3 Main results
In the remainder of the paper, the games are always played on finite graphs has defined in
Section 2, and they always involve colors in C, players in A, and preferences (≺a)a∈A.
Theorem 8 presents implications, and absence of stated implication is discussed afterwards.
For several implications we use the assumption that the set of preferences is closed under an-
tagonism, i.e. for all ≺a there exists b ∈ A such that ≺b = ≺
−1
a .
Theorem 8. Let (≺a)a∈A be closed under antagonism. The statements below refer to all
the games built with C, A, and (≺a)a∈A, and the diagram displays implications between the
statements.
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• OIR: Optimality is regular.
• fm-SOS: There are finite-memory subgame-optimal strategies.
• fm-NE: There are finite-memory Nash equilibrium.
• FTG-d: The future threshold games are determined.
• TG-ufmd In every game, the threshold games are determined using uniformly finite
memory.
• FTG-ufmd: In every game, the future threshold games are determined using uniformly
finite memory.
FTG-ufmd ∧ OIR
FTG-d ∧ fm-SOS
FTG-ufmd fm-NE
TG-ufmd
1
2 3
4 5
Proof. 1. By Lemma 24.
2. Subgame-optimal strategies in an antagonistic two-player win all future threshold games
that are winnable by their player.
3. By Lemma 21.
4. Clear.
5. By Lemma 15.
We will show in Subsection 5.2 that neither Implication (1) (Example 32) nor Implication (2)
(Example 31) are reversible. For the remaining implications, we do not have answers regarding
their reversibility. Regarding Implication (4), note that if we were to fix a specific graph, it
would be trivial to separate the two notions. The difficulty lies in the requirement to deal with
all finite graphs simultaneously.
Open Question 9. Is there a preference ≺ such that all threshold games for ≺ are uniformly
finite memory determined, but not all future threshold games?
Regarding Implications (3) and (5), the ultimate goal would be precise characterization
of the properties of (future) threshold games sufficient and necessary to have finite-memory
Nash equilibria, akin to the characterization of the existence of optimal positional strategies by
Gimbert and Zielonka [11].
Open Question 10. How much more requirements are needed in addition to TG-ufmd to
imply fm-NE?
8 Extending finite memory determinacy
Theorem 8 relies on many games having the assumed property, i.e the statements are univer-
sal quantifications over games. However, a given game might enjoy some property, e.g. existence
of NE, not only due to the preferences on infinite sequences of colors, but also due to the specific
structure of the underlying graph. Theorem 12 below captures this idea. It is a generalization
of our main result in [19]. (The new Assumption 2 is indeed weaker.)
Definition 11. Given a game g, a preference ≺ is Mont (in g) if for every regular run h0ˆ ρ ∈
[H] and for every family (hn)n∈N of paths in (V,E) such that h0ˆ . . . hˆnˆ ρ ∈ [H] for all n, if
h0ˆ . . . hˆnˆ ρ ≺ h0ˆ . . . hˆn+1ˆ ρ for all n then h0ˆ ρ ≺ h0ˆ h1ˆ h2ˆ h3 . . . .
Theorem 12. Let g be a game such that
1. For all a ∈ A the future threshold games for a in g are determined, and each of Player 1
and 2 can win their winnable games via k fixed strategies using T bits each.
2. Optimality for such a strategy is regular using D bits.
3. The preferences in g are Mont.
Then g has a Nash equilibrium made of strategies using |A|(kD + kT + log k) + 1 bits each.
Proof. By Lemmata 24 and 22.
The difference between Theorem 12 and Theorem 8 is similar to the difference between
previous works by the authors for games on infinite trees (without memory concern): Namely,
between [16] and [17]. The first result characterizes the preferences that guarantee existence of
NE for all games; the second result relies on the specific structure of a given game to guarantee
existence of NE for the given game.
4 Main proofs
This section organizes the lemmata for the two main results into several paragraphs, depending
on the increasing strength of the assumptions.
Lemma without specific extra assumptions: Lemma 13 below collects basic useful facts
on how the guarantees behaves wrt strategies and future games.
Lemma 13. Let g be a game on a graph, let ≺a be a strict weak order preference for some
player a, let h ∈ H, let sa be a strategy for a in g
h, let h′ ∈ H(sa), and let s′a be a strategy for
a in ghˆ h
′
.
1. Then h′ˆ γa(hˆ h′, sh
′
a ) ⊆ γa(h, sa) for all h
′ ∈ H(sa).
2. If γa(hˆ h
′, s′a) ( γa(hˆ h′, sh
′
a ), there exists ρ ∈ γa(hˆ h
′, sh
′
a ) such that ρ ≺
hˆ h′
a ρ
′ for all
ρ′ ∈ γa(hˆ h′, s′a).
3. If γa(hˆ h
′, s′a) ⊆ γa(hˆ h′, sh
′
a ) then h
′ˆ γa(hˆ h′, s′a) ⊆ γa(h, sa).
Proof. 1. Let ρ ∈ γa(hˆ h
′, sh′a ), so by Definition 4 there exists ρ′ ∈ [H(sh
′
a )] such that ¬(ρ ≺
hˆ h′
a
ρ′), i.e. ¬(h′ˆ ρ ≺ha h′ˆ ρ′). So h′ˆ ρ ∈ γa(h, sa) since h′ˆ ρ′ ∈ [H(sa)] ⊆ γa(h, sa).
2. Let ρ ∈ γa(hˆ h
′, sh
′
a ) \ γa(hˆ h
′, s′a), so ρ ≺hˆ h
′
a ρ
′ for all ρ′ ∈ γa(hˆ h′, s′a) by Definition 4.
3. Let ρ ∈ γa(hˆ h
′, s′a), so h′ˆ ρ ∈ h′ˆ γa(hˆ h′, sh
′
a ) by assumption, so h
′ˆ ρ ∈ γa(h, sa) by Lemma 13.1.
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Using uniformly finite memory in the threshold games of a given game: Lemma 14
below establishes an equivalence between existence of simple optimal strategies and simple ways
of winning threshold games, for a given player in a given game. Note that determinacy is not
assumed.
Lemma 14. Let Fa be a finite set of strategies for some player a in some game g. The following
are equivalent.
1. a has an optimal strategy in Fa for g;
2. a wins each of her winnable threshold games in g via strategies in Fa;
3. a wins each of her winnable non-strict threshold games in g via strategies in Fa.
Moreover replacing ”in Fa” above with ”using m bits of memory” is correct.
Proof. Let us assume 1, so let sa be such that γa(sa) = Γa. By definition of Γa there is no s
′
a
such that γa(sa) ( Γa, so sa wins all winnable (non-strict) threshold games in g, hence 2 and 3.
Conversely let us assume 2 or 3. For all ρ ∈ [H]\Γa, Player 1 has a winning strategy s
ρ
a ∈ Fa
in the (non-strict) threshold game for a and ρ in g. In this case let sρa be a winning strategy
in Fa. By finiteness at least one of the s
ρ
a, which we name sa, wins the (non-strict) threshold
games for all ρ /∈ Γa. This shows that γa(sa) ⊆ Γa, so equality holds, hence optimality of sa.
Moreover, a player in a game with n vertices has at most (n2m)(n2
m) strategies using m bits
of memory (by the σ representation).
In Lemma 14 above, the implication 1. ⇒ 2. ∧ 3. holds in a more general context. However,
the finiteness of Fa is key to the converse, as well as to the convenient remark that we can
sometimes safely remain vague about whether we speak about strict or non-strict thresholds.
This and Lemma 14 are used in Lemma 15 for antagonistic games below.
Lemma 15. Let F be a finite set of strategies for players a and/or b in some antagonistic game
g. The following are equivalent.
1. g has an NE using strategies in F ;
2. the threshold games for a in g are determined via strategies in F ;
3. the threshold games for a in g are determined, and each player wins each of her winnable
(non-strict) threshold games in g via strategies in F .
Moreover replacing ”in F” above with ”using m bits of memory” is correct.
Proof. By Lemma 14 the following are equivalent for all propositions D.
• D∧ each player has an optimal strategy for g in F ;
• D∧ a wins each of her winnable threshold games in g, and b wins each of her winnable
non-strict threshold games in g, all via strategies in F ;
• D∧ each player wins each of her winnable (non-strict) threshold games in g via strategies
in F .
Let D be ”the threshold games for a in g are determined”, and let us prove that the above
assertions correspond to 1, 2, and 3 in the same order. It is a copy-paste for 3, it is a definition
unfolding for 2, so let us focus on 1.
10 Extending finite memory determinacy
Let s be an NE that uses strategies in F . Let ρ be he run induced by s, and let ρt be a
threshold. If ρt ≺a ρ, Player 1 wins ga,ρt by using sa; otherwise Player 2 wins by using sb. It
shows that D holds. Since ρ is a ≺a-minimum of γa(sa), the existence of some s
′
a such that
γa(s
′
a) ( γa(sa) would contradict s being an NE, so γa(sa) = Γa. And likewise γb(sb) = Γb.
Conversely let us assume D and let sa ∈ F and sb ∈ F satisfy γa(sa) = Γa and γb(sb) = Γb.
First note that Γa∩Γb is non-empty, as witnessed by the run ρ induced by (sa, sb). Since ρ ∈ Γa,
Player 1 cannot win ga,ρ, so Player 2 wins it, which implies that runs ≺a-greater than ρ are
not in Γb. Likewise runs ≺b-greater than ρ are not in Γa. Therefore elements of Γa ∩ Γb are
≺a-equivalent, and (sa, sb) is an NE.
Note that Lemmata 14 and 15 can be extended to games in normal form since the two proofs
do not use the sequentiality of the game at all.
Definition 16. If the assertions of Lemma 15 hold, we say that the game is finite-memory
determined, and its value is the equivalence class Γa ∩ Γb.
Corollary 17. If an antagonistic game is finite-memory determined, its value has a regular
witness.
Proof. By Lemma 15 there is a finite-memory NE, whose induced run is regular.
Using uniformly finite memory in several threshold games: Lemma 18.1 below relies
on Lemma 14 to give a rather weak sufficient condition for a given player to have finite-memory
best responses in all antagonistic games. Lemma 18.2 relies on Lemma 18.1 and will help us
prove subgame-optimality in Lemma 24, by allowing us to restrict our attention to regular runs.
For this, reg denotes the infinite sequences of the form u1 . . . un(w1 . . . wk)
ω.
Lemma 18. Fix a player a and her preference such that for all one-player games ga, player a
wins her winnable threshold games in ga using uniformly finite memory. Then in all antagonistic
games involving a and b,
1. all finite-memory strategies of b is met with a finite-memory best response by a;
2. for all finite-memory strategies sb, we have reg ∩ γb(sb) = reg ∩ Γb implies γb(sb) = Γb.
Proof. 1. Let g be such a game involving a and b, and let sb be a finite-memory strategy of
b, implemented by σb using m bits of memory. Let g
′ be a defined as follows: the vertices
are in V ′ := V × {0, 1}m, for the coloring let Λ′(v, q) := Λ(v), the preferences are like in
g, and ((v, q)(v′, q′)) ∈ E′ iff (v, v′) ∈ E ∧ q′ = π2 ◦ σ(v, q) ∧ (v ∈ Vb ⇒ v′ = π1 ◦ σ(v, q))).
Therefore only player a is playing in g′, and she can induce exaclty the same color traces
as in g when player b plays according to sb. By uniformity assumption and Lemma 14
player a has a finite-memory optimal strategy s′a in g′. Using s′a and sb one can construct
a finite-memory best-response for a to sb in g: player a feeds the history h in g to sb and
thus keeps track of the corresponding history h′ in g′. Player a then uses s′a to compute a
move in g′, which corresponds to a unique possible move to be played in g.
2. Γb ⊆ γb(sb) by definition. By Lemma 18.1 let sa be a finite-memory best response to
sb. The run ρ induced by (sa, sb) is therefore a regular ≺b-minimum of γb(sb). Since
reg ∩ γb(sb) = reg ∩ Γb, it is also in Γb.
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The regular-Mont condition below is a weakening of the Mont condition, by considering only
some regular runs.
Definition 19. A preference ≺ is regular-Mont if the following holds: for all h0, h1, h2, h3 ∈ C
∗,
if h0h
n
1h2h
ω
3 ≺ h0h
n+1
1 h2h
ω
3 for all n ∈ N, then h0h2h
ω
3 ≺ h0h
ω
1 .
The contraposition of Lemma 20 below will be used in the proof of Lemma 24 to say that
suitable uniformity of a preference implies that it is regular-Mont.
Lemma 20. Fix a player a and her preference ≺a. If ≺a is not regular-Mont, there is a one-
player game where a does not win her winnable (non-strict) threshold games with uniformly
finite memory.
Proof. Let us assume that ≺a is not regular-Mont, so let h0, h1, h2, h3 ∈ C
∗ be such that
h0h
n
1h2h
ω
3 ≺ h0h
n+1
1 h2h
ω
3 for all n ∈ N, but ¬(h0h2h
ω
3 ≺ h0h
ω
1 ). So h0h
ω
1 ≺ h0h1h2h
ω
3 , since ≺a
is a strict weak order. In the game below, player a can win all the thresholds h0h
n
1h2h
ω
3 but
requires unbounded finite memory.
start
h0
h1
h2
h3
Lemmata 21 and 22 both show the existence of finite-memory NE. They both assume ex-
istence of finite-memory consistent-optimal strategies, but the other assumptions are slightly
different. Lemma 21 will be weakened (for the sake of simplicity) to obtain Implication 3 of
Theorem 8; whereas Lemma 22, making assumptions only about the given game and its derived
games, will be combined to Lemma 24 to obtain Theorem 12. The proofs ot Lemmata 21 and
22 are similar: The beginning is the same and is writen only once; the ends are similar yet not
enough to copy-paste it; and the middle parts are clearly different, thus making a factorization
of the two lemmata difficult.
Lemma 21. Let g be a game, and let us assume the following.
1. All players have consistent-optimal strategies in g using S bits.
2. For all players a, for all games with n vertices, all (non-strict) threshold games for a are
determined and Player 2 wins her winnable ones using f(n) bits.
Then g has a Nash equilibrium made of strategies using max(|A|S, f(|V |(1 + 2|A|S))) + 1 bits
each.
Proof. For all a let sa be a consistent-optimal finite-memory strategy for a in g, and let ρNE be
the run induced by the strategy profile (sa)a∈A. It will become the run induced by the claimed
finite-memory NE, once we ensure via finite memory that no player has an incentive to deviate.
By finiteness of memory, ρNE ∈ reg, so let l be a lasso arena that corresponds to ρNE , i.e.
where the copies of a vertex from g are labeled with the same player and color. Note that
the lasso may be chosen with at most |V |2|A|S vertices, since when the ρNE comes back to
a previously visited vertex with all the players having the same memory content, the lasso is
cycling.
For every player a, we construct a game ga as follows: the preferences are as in g, we take
the disjoint union of l and the arena of g, and we let ga start at the start of l. Finally, there is
12 Extending finite memory determinacy
an edge from vl ∈ l to v ∈ g if vl is controlled by a and if there is one edge in g from v
′ to v,
where vl is a copy of v
′. So the players other than a cannot deviate from l.
gaa,ρNE is the threshold game derived from g
a for player a and threshold ρNE . Since sa is
consistent-subgame optimal, it is optimal at all finite prefixes of ρNE, i.e. ρ ∈ Γa(h) for all
decompositions ρNE = hˆ ρ, so Player 1 loses g
a
a,ρNE
(on behalf of player a). This game is finite-
memory determined by assumption, so let s−a be a finite-memory winning strategy for Player
2.
Now let s′a be the following strategy for player a in g: Follow sa until a player b deviates,
in which case play anything positionally if b = a, and follow s−b otherwise. This ensures that b
cannot get a better outcome by deviating unilaterally, so (s′a)a∈A is an NE.
Every player uses S bits of memory to follow ρNE , and she uses (|A| − 1)S bits to know how
the others are supposed to play and thus detect when someone has deviated and who. To be able
to take part in the coalition ”punishing” the deviator, she uses f(|V |(1+2|A|S)) bits to remember
the s−a. Since the two phases of the play, i.e. following ρNE and ”punishing” a deviator, are
not simultaneous, the memory can be repurposed: altogether max(|A|S, f(|V |(1 + 2|A|S))) + 1
bits suffice, where the +1 is used to remember the current phase.
Using uniformly finite memory for the future threshold games of a given game:
Lemma 22. Let g be a game satisfying the following.
1. All players have consistent-optimal strategies in g using S bits.
2. For each player, her future threshold games in g are determined, and Player 2 wins her
winnable ones using k fixed strategies using T bits each.
3. Optimality for each strategy from Assumption 2 is regular using D bits.
Then g has a Nash equilibrium made of strategies using |A|max(S, kD + kT ) + 1 bits each.
Proof. Let sa and ρNE be as in the proof of Lemma 21, and likewise let us build a strategy
s−a that prevents a from deviating. For all a ∈ A let t1−a, . . . , tk−a be the strategies from
Assumption 2, and for each ti−a let Ai be an automaton using D bits of memory and telling for
which histories ti−a is optimal. Let s′a be the following strategy for player a in g: Follow sa until
a player b deviates, in which case play anything positionally if b = a, and otherwise take part in
the optimal ti−b of smallest index i.
Consider the future games starting right after deviation of b. Their antagonisitic versions for
a against the others have values at most ρNE wrt ≺b, by optimality of sb. So choosing the right
ti−b as above ensures that b cannot get a better outcome by deviating unilaterally from ρNE , so
(s′a)a∈A is an NE.
Every player uses S bits of memory to follow ρNE , and she uses (|A| − 1)S bits to know how
the others are supposed to play and thus detect when someone has deviated and who. To be
able to take part in the coalition ”punishing” the deviator, she uses (|A|−1)kT bits to remember
the ti−a for all a but herself; and she uses (|A| − 1)kD bits to know when a ti−a is optimal. Since
the two phases of the play, i.e. following ρNE and ”punishing” a deviator, are not simultaneous,
the memory can be repurposed: altogether |A|max(S, kD + kT ) + 1 bits suffice, where the +1
is used to remember the current phase.
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Using uniformly finite memory for several future threshold games: Lemma 23 is a
complex variant of Lemma 18.1 that considers future games. It is not invoked in our main results
but will be useful in Subsection 5.2 to further weaken the assumption that optimality is regular.
Lemma 23. Fix a player a and her preference such that for all one-player games ga, player
a wins her winnable future threshold games in ga via uniformly finite memory. Then in all
antagonistic games involving a and b, for all finite memory strategies sb, there are finitely many
finite-memory strategies t1, . . . , tn such that for all histories h, one of the ti is a best response
by a to sb starting at h.
Proof. (This proof is similar to that of Lemma 18.1.) Let g be such a game involving a and b,
and let sb be a finite-memory strategy of b. Let g
′ be defined wrt g as in the proof of Lemma 18.1.
Only player a is playing in g′, so by uniformity assumption let finite-memory strategies t′1, . . . , t
′
n
be such that all winnable future threshold games in g′ is won by some t′i. Using t
′
i and sb one
can construct a finite-memory strategy ti : player a feeds the history h in g to sb and thus keeps
track of the corresponding history h′ in g′. Player a then uses t′i to compute a move in g
′, which
corresponds to a unique possible move to be played in g. This defines a strategy ti in g. Now
for all h in g, some t′i is an optimal strategy for a at h
′ in g′, and the corresponding ti is is a
best response by a to sb starting at h.
Main construction: Lemma 24 below concludes that a player a has a subgame optimal
strategy. Assumptions 1 and 2 suffice to construct the candidate strategy, whereas the other
assumptions are only used to prove subgame optimality. Assumption 3 is used to build uniformly
finite memory best responses by b for all histories. Then Assumption 4a (resp. 4b) allows us to
conclude quickly (resp. to continue the proof). Assumptions 3 and 4(b)ii are partly redundant
due to our factoring out of two theorems and proofs. Note that determinacy need not hold.
Lemma 24. Let a and b be the players of an antagonistic game g. Let us assume the following:
1. player a wins her winnable future threshold games in g via k strategies using T bits each,
2. Optimality of such a strategy is regular using D bits,
3. players b wins her winnable future threshold games either in g or in every one-player game
using uniformly finite memory.
4. Either of the following holds:
(a) a’s preference is Mont;
(b) i. optimality is regular for b’s strategies in g, and
ii. Each of players a and b wins her winnable threshold games in every one-player
game using uniformly finite memory.
Then player a has a subgame-optimal strategy in g using kD + kT + log k bits.
Proof. Let t1, . . . , tk be the strategies from Assumption 1. By Lemma 14, for all h one of the
ti is optimal at h. By Assumption 2 there exist automata A1, . . . , Ak using D bits that decide
their respective optimality depending on h.
We define a strategy s for player a as follows: always store the index of one of the ti, and
follow the selected ti until it ceases to be optimal at some history. Then select an optimal tj
and follow it. Storing the index of the strategy requires log k bits; simulating all the k strategies
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in parallel uses kT bits; and deciding optimality kD bits, so kD + kT + log k bits suffice to
implement this strategy.
It remains to show that s is indeed subgame-optimal.
To show that γa(h, s
h) = Γa(h) for all h, let h0 ∈ H, let ρ ∈ H(s
h0). In a slight notation
overload, for all histories h let th be the one strategy ti that our construction of s follows at
h. Also, let (hn)n≥1 be such that the n-th change occurring strictly after h0 occurs at history
h′n := h0ˆ h1ˆ . . . hˆn, and let us make a case disjunction on whether (hn)n≥1 is finite or infinite.
First case, player a changes strategies finitely many times along ρ, say N times. Applying
Lemma 13.3 N times yields h1ˆ . . . hˆN γˆa(h
′
N , t
h′N
h′
N
) ⊆ · · · ⊆ h1ˆ γa(h
′
1, t
h′1
h′1
) ⊆ γa(h0, t
h0
h0
) ⊆ Γa(h0).
So ρ ∈ Γa(h0) since ρ ∈ h1ˆ . . . hˆN γˆa(h
′
N , t
h′N
h′
N
).
Second case, player a changes strategies infinitely many times along ρ. Regardless of which
disjunct of Assumption 3 holds, there are finitely many finite-memory strategies ri for b in g
such that for all h one of the ri, which we call rh, is a best-response by b to th. So (rh, th)
induces a minimum ρh of Γa(h). Since the ti and the ri are finitely many and are finite-memory
strategies, the ρh are also finitely many, and regular.
Since a changes strategies at h′n+1 we have h
′
nˆ ρh′n ≺a h
′
n+1ˆ ρh′n+1 (or ρh′n ≺
h′n
a hn+1ˆ ρh′n+1). By
finiteness some ρh must occur infinitely often, let ρ
′ be the constant run of the the corresponding
subsequence ρh′
ϕ(n)
. So h′
ϕ(0)ˆ ρ
′ ≺a · · · ≺a h′ϕ(n)ˆ ρ
′ ≺a . . . . If Assumption 4a holds, a’s preference
is Mont and therefore h0ˆ ρ
′ ≺a ρ, i.e. ρ ∈ Γa(h0) since h0ˆ ρ′ ∈ Γa(h0).
Let us now deal with the case where Assumption 4b holds. By Lemma 18.2 and Assump-
tion 4(b)ii (for b) we can assume wlog that ρ is regular. By Assumption 4(b)i, suitable rh can
also be chosen via a finite automaton, in which case h′
ϕ(n) can be decomposed as h0uw
n. So
h0uˆ ρ
′ ≺a h0uwˆ ρ′ ≺a · · · ≺a h0uwn ρˆ′ ≺a . . . . By Assumption 4(b)ii (for a) and contraposition
of Lemma 20 we have h0uˆ ρ
′ ≺a ρ, i.e. ρ ∈ Γa(h0) since h0ˆ ρ′ ∈ Γa(h0).
5 Discussion
5.1 Comparison to previous work
As mentioned above, a similar but weaker result (compared to our Lemma 22) has previously
been obtained by Brihaye, De Pril and Schewe [4],[23, Theorem 4.4.14]. They use cost
functions rather than preference relations. Our setting of strict weak orders is strictly more
general 3. However, even if both frameworks are available, it is more convenient for us to have
results formulated via preference relations rather than cost functions: Cost functions can be
translated immediately into preferences, whereas translating preferences to cost functions is
more cumbersome. In particular, it can be unclear to what extend nice preferences translate
into nice cost functions. Note also that prefix-linearity for strict weak orders is more general
than prefix-linearity for cost functions. We will see in Subsection 5.2 that prefix-linearity implies
the optimality-is-regular property by a very simple argument.
As a second substantial difference, [23, Theorem 4.4.14] requires either prefix-independent
cost functions and finite-memory determinacy of the induced threshold games, or prefix-linear
cost functions and optimal positional strategies in the induced antagonistic games. In particular,[23,
3For example, the lexicographic combination of two payoff functions can typically not be modeled as a payoff
function, as R× {0, 1} (with lexicographic order) does not embed into R as a linear order, cf. Subsection 6.2.
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Theorem 4.4.14] cannot be applied to bounded energy parity games, where finite prefixes of the
run do impact the overall value for the players, and where at least the protagonist requires
memory to execute a winning strategy.
Before [23, 4], it had already been stated by Paul and Simon [22] that multi-player multi-
outcome Muller games have Nash equilibria consisting of finite memory strategies. As (two-
player win/lose) Muller games are finite-memory determined [13], and the corresponding prefer-
ences are obviously prefix independent, this result is also a consequence of [23, Theorem 4.4.14].
Another result subsumed by [23, Theorem 4.4.14] (and subsequently by our main theorem) is
found in [3] by Brihaye, Bruye`re and De Pril.
5.2 Exploring optimality is regular
We shall discuss the optimality-is-regular property and its relationship to some other, established
properties of preferences. We will in particular show that it is not dispensable in our main
theorem (Example 31), as in its absence, uniform finite-memory determinacy no longer implies
the existence of finite memory subgame-optimal strategies. On the other hand, the optimality-
is-regular property is also not necessary, as shown by Example 32.
Recall that a preference relation ≺⊆ [H] × [H] is called prefix-linear, if ρ ≺ ρ′ ⇔ hˆ ρ ≺ hˆ ρ′
for all ρ, ρ′, hˆ ρ ∈ [H]. It is prefix-independent, if ρ ≺ ρ′ ⇔ hˆ ρ ≺ ρ′ and ρ′ ≺ ρ⇔ ρ′ ≺ hˆ ρ for all
ρ, ρ′, hˆ ρ ∈ [H]. Clearly, a prefix-independent preference is prefix-linear.
As a further generalization, we will consider automatic-piecewise prefix-linear preferences
≺. Here, there is an equivalence relation on H with equivalence classes (pieces for short) in
H and satisfying three constraints: First, the histories in the same piece end with the same
vertex. Second, there exists a deterministic finite automaton, without accepting states, that
reads histories and such that two histories are equivalent iff reading them leads to the same
states. Third, for all hˆ ρ, hˆ ρ′, h′ˆ ρ, h′ˆ ρ′ ∈ [H], if h′ = h ∈ H, then hˆ ρ ≺ hˆ ρ′ ⇔ h′ˆ ρ ≺ h′ˆ ρ′.
The extension to automatic-piecewise prefix-linear preferences ensures that e.g. safety and
reachability games are also covered. In fact, most of the common payoff functions considered
in the literature give rise to automatic-piecewise prefix-linear preferences. Examples include
mean-payoff, discounted payoff, Muller, mean-payoff parity and bounded energy parity games
(see Subsection 6.1 below for the latter).
Of the popular winning conditions, many are actually prefix-independent, such as parity,
Muller, mean-payoff, cost-Parity, cost-Streett [10], etc. Clearly, any combination of prefix-
independent conditions itself will be prefix-independent. Typical examples of non-prefix inde-
pendent, but prefix-linear conditions are reachability, energy, and discounted payoff. Combining
prefix-linear conditions not necessarily yields another prefix-linear condition. However, we can
easily verify that combining a reachability or energy condition with any prefix-linear condition
yields an automatic-piecewise prefix-linear condition (provided that energy is bounded).
Proposition 25. Automatic-piecewise prefix-linear preferences have the optimality-is-regular
property.
Proof. Assume automatic-piecewise prefix-linear preferences. Whether a finite memory strategy
is optimal at some history depends only on its memory content at that history, and on the piece
the history falls into.
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Proposition 26. A preference ≺ is automatic-piecewise prefix-linear iff there is a finite set M
of regular sets M ⊆ H such that:
∀p, q ∈ Cω ∃M ∈M ∀h ∈ H (h ∈M ⇔ hˆ p ≺ hˆ q)
Proof. If ≺ is automatic-piecewise prefix-linear, then the pieces satisfy the property of M.
Conversely, given some finite setM with the given property, we can consider the finest partition
where each part is some boolean combination of elements of M. This partition is automatic,
and witnesses automatic-piecewise prefix linearity ≺.
Definition 27. We say that ≺ has the weak oir property if
∀p, q ∈ Cω ∩ reg ∃M ∈ Reg ∀h ∈ H (h ∈M ⇔ hˆ p ≺ hˆ q)
where Reg are the regular subsets of C∗.
Observation 28. The OIR property implies the weak OIR property.
Proof. Given regular p and q, we can construct finite graphs P and Q, such that the only infinite
run through P has colors p, and the only infinite run through Q has colors q. We further use a
clique K where all colors appear, controlled by a different player. Then we merge them together
as follows: The game starts in K, from where a choice vertex v controlled by the protagonist
can be reached. The vertex v has two outgoing edges, to P and to Q.
Now we use the OIR property on the constant strategy going to P . At some history h
ending in v, we find that hˆ p ≺ hˆ q iff this constant strategy is not optimal at h. By using
the construction with all finitely many different choices for the color of v, we obtain the full
claim.
Proposition 29. Let g be an antagonistic game involving a and b, and let us assume the
following.
1. for all one-player games gb, player b wins her winnable future threshold games in gb via
uniformly finite memory.
2. Player a wins her winnable future threshold games in g using uniformly finite memory.
3. ≺a has the weak OIR property
Then ≺a has also the OIR property.
Proof. Let sa be a finite-memory strategy for a in some antagonistic game g involving a and b.
We want to construct an automaton that decides whether sa is optimal at some input history.
By Assumption 1 and Lemma 23, there are finitely many finite-memory strategies sib such that
for every history h, one of the sib is a best response by b to sa at h. Depending on the h from
which we start, playing some fixed sib against sa yields a tail from some finitely many tails pij .
Moreover we can decide which j from h (and i) in an automatic way.
By Assumption 2 and Lemma 14 there are finitely many finite-memory strategies tka for a
such that for all histories h, one of the tka is optimal at h. By Assumption 1 and Lemma 23 again,
there are finitely many finite-memory strategies tlb such that for all histories h and strategies t
k
a,
one of the tlb is a best response to t
k
a. Depending on the h from which we start, playing some
fixed tjb against t
i
a yields a tail from some finitely many tails qklm. Moreover we can decide which
m from h (and k, l) in an automatic way.
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Now, sa is not optimal at some history h iff one of the t
i
a does better at h, which is equivalent
to
min
i
hˆ pij(i,h) ≺a max
k
min
l
hˆ qklm(k,l,h)
By invoking the weak OIR property for the finitely many tails pij and qklm, and using that j
and m depend on h in an automatic way, we can test this property with a finite automaton.
Corollary 30. If all future threshold games are uniformly finite-memory determined, then ≺
has the weak OIR property iff it has the OIR property.
Example 31. Fix some non-regular set A ⊆ N. We define a payoff function PA : {0, 1}
ω →
N ∪ {+∞} as follows:
PA(p) =


+∞ p = 0ω
2n+ 1 ∃q ∈ {0, 1}ω (p = 0n10q ∧ n ∈ A) ∨ (p = 0n11q ∧ n /∈ A)
2n ∃q ∈ {0, 1}ω (p = 0n10q ∧ n /∈ A) ∨ (p = 0n11q ∧ n ∈ A)
The induced preference ≺A is given by p ≺A q iff PA(p) < PA(q).
Claim: The threshold games for ≺A are uniformly finite-memory determined.
Proof. If the protagonist can win the safety game for staying on vertices colored 0, he has a
positional strategy for doing so. This strategy would win all winnable threshold games on that
graph. If he can not win that game, then the opponent can force a 1 within k ≤ n moves (where
n is the size of the graph), and she can do so positionally. In particular, the protagonist loses
all threshold games for thresholds 0j11q or 0j10q for j > k. As all threshold games here have
ω-regular winning conditions, and there are only finitely many cases left, uniform finite-memory
determinacy follows.
Claim: The games built with ≺A do not have the optimality-is-regular property, and the
player with preference ≺A does not always have a finite-memory subgame-optimal strategy.
Proof. Consider the game graph depicted in Figure 2, with the protagonist (with preference
≺A) controlling the diamond vertex and the opponent the circle vertices. Further, consider the
positional strategy where the protagonist always goes to the vertex labeled 0. If there were an
automaton that decides whether this strategy is optimal after some history, then by applying
this automaton to histories of the form 0n1 allows us to decide whether n ∈ A, a contradiction to
the choice of A being non-regular. Similarly, by inspecting the choice a finite-memory subgame-
optimal strategy of the player makes after some history of the form 0n1 allows us to decide
whether n ∈ A, again a contradiction.
0start 1 0
1
Figure 2: The graph for the game in Examples 31 and 32
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Example 32. Fix some non-regular set B ⊆ N. We define a payoff function PB : {0, 1}
ω →
N ∪ {−∞,+∞} as follows:
PB(p) =


+∞ p = 0ω
2n + 1 n ∈ B ∧ ∃q ∈ {0, 1}ω p = 0n10q
2n n /∈ B ∨ ∃q ∈ {0, 1}ω p = 0n11q
The induced preference ≺B is given by p ≺B q iff PB(p) < PB(q).
Claim: The player with preference ≺B always has a finite-memory subgame-optimal strat-
egy.
Proof. The player first plays a safety game where he tries to stay on vertices colored 0 as long
as possible. If a 1 is ever reached, and the player can choose, he will go a vertex colored 0 in
the next step.
Claim: The games built with ≺B do not have the optimality-is-regular property.
Proof. Consider the again game graph depicted in Figure 2, with the protagonist (with preference
≺B) controlling the diamond vertex and the opponent the circle vertices. Further, consider the
positional strategy where the protagonist always goes to the vertex labeled 1. If there were an
automaton that decides whether this strategy is optimal after some history, then by applying
this automaton to histories of the form 0n1 allows us to decide whether n ∈ B, a contradiction
to the choice of B being non-regular.
5.3 On the Mont condition
If we consider all games on finite graphs involving a certain set of preferences, we saw by
Lemma 20 that the regular-Mont condition comes for free in our setting. If we explicitly assume
the regular-Mont condition to hold, it suffices on the other hand to make assumptions merely
about games played on some fixed graph. We shall now give an example that shows that
merely assuming optimality is regular and the uniform finite-memory determinacy of the future
threshold games played on a given graph does not suffice to conclude the existence of Nash
equilibria.
c1start b1 c2 b2
Figure 3: The graph for the game in Example 33
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Example 33 (4). The game g in Figure 3 involves Player 1 (2) who owns the circle (box)
vertices. Who owns the diamond is irrelevant. The payoff for Player 1 (2) is the number of visits
to a box (circle) vertex, if this number is finite, and is −1 otherwise.
Claim: All future threshold games in g are determined via positional strategies.
Proof. Let s1 be the positional strategy where Player 1 chooses b1 when in c1 and the diamond
when in c2, let s2 be the positional strategy where Player 1 chooses the diamond in c1 and b2
in c2. Let s∞ be the positional strategy where Player 1 always chooses the diamond. Likewise,
let t1 be the positional strategy of Player 2 going to c2 in b1 and to diamond in b2, let t2 go to
diamond in b1 and to c1 in b2, and let t∞ always go to the diamond.
Consider some history h ending in c1, which has seen n occurrences of box vertices. By
playing s1, Player 1 can win the future threshold game starting after h for all threshold k ≤ n+1.
His opponent can win for all higher thresholds by playing t2. By symmetry of the game, we see
that also for histories ending in c2, b1 or b2, the player can win all winnable future threshold
games using one of s1, s2, t1, t2, and his opponent can win the remaining ones using the
counterpart strategy.
Claim: The game g has no Nash equilibrium (so in particular, neither optimal strategies
nor finite memory Nash equilibrium).
Proof. In the run induced by a putative NE, one of the players has to choose the diamond at
some point (to avoid payoff −1), but by postponing this choice to next time, the player can
increase her payoff by 1.
5.4 On uniform finite-memory determinacy
We have seen that the existence of a uniform memory bound sufficient to win all winnable
threshold games is necessary for the existence of finite-memory Nash equilibria. A typical
example for a class of games failing this condition is found in mean-payoff parity games (which,
being prefix-independent, have the optimality-is-regular property). The same example, however,
also works as a discounted-payoff parity game.
bstart g
1
0
0
0
Figure 4: The graph for Example 34
Example 34. Let g be the one-player game in Figure 4. The payoff of a run that visits the
vertex g infinitely often is the limit (inferior or superior) of the average payoff. It is zero if g
is visited finitely many times only. For any threshold t ∈ R, if t < 1, the player has a winning
finite-memory strategy: cycle p times in b, where p > 11−t , visit g once, cycle p times in b, and so
on. If t ≥ 1, the player has no winning strategy at all. So the thresholds games of g, and likewise
4This example is based on an example communicated to the authors by Axel Haddad and Thomas Brihaye,
which in turn is based on a construction in [5].
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for the future game of g, are finite-memory determined. The game has no finite-memory Nash
equilibrium nonetheless, since the player can get a payoff as closed to 1 as she wants, but not 1.
Uniform finite-memory determinacy can sometimes be recovered by considering ε-versions
instead: We partition the payoffs in blocks of size ε, and let the player be indifferent within
the same block. Clearly any Nash equilibrium from the ε-discretized version yields an ε-Nash
equilibrium of the original game. If the original preferences were prefix-independent, the modified
preferences still are. Moreover, as there are now only finitely many relevant threshold games per
graph, their uniform finite-memory determinacy follows from mere finite-memory determinacy.
In such a situation, our result allows us to conclude that multi-player multi-outcome games have
finite memory ε-Nash equilibria. For example, we obtain:
Corollary 35. Multi-player multi-outcome mean-payoff parity games have finite memory ε-
Nash equilibria.
Here a multi-player multi-outcome mean-payoff parity game is understood to be a game
where each player has payoff labels associated with it, and each vertex some priority. Players
have some strict weak order preference on the pairs of the lim sup or lim inf of their average
payoff on a prefix and the least priority seen infinitely often, which is consistent with the usual
order on the payoff component (i.e. getting more payoff while keeping the same priority is always
better). A ε-Nash equilibrium is one where no player can improve by changing the priority, and
no player can improve their payoff by more than ε.
6 Applications
We shall briefly mention two classes of games covered by our main theorem, but not by the results
from [23, 4], (bounded) energy parity games and games with the lexicographic product of mean-
payoff and reachability preferences. We leave the investigation whether winning conditions
defined via LTL[F ] or LTL[D] formulae [1] match the criteria of Theorem 8 to future work.
Another area of prospective examples to explore are multi-dimensional objectives as studied
e.g. in [25, 9].
6.1 Energy parity games
Energy games were first introduced in [7]: Two players take turns moving a token through a
graph, while keeping track of the current energy level, which will be some integer. Each move
either adds or subtracts to the energy level, and if the energy level ever reaches 0, the protagonist
loses. These conditions were later combined with parity winning conditions in [8] to yield energy
parity games as a model for a system specification that keeps track of gaining and spending of
some resource, while simultaneously conforming to a parity specification.
In both [7] and [8] the energy levels are a priori not bounded from above. This is a problem for
the applicability of Theorem 12, since unbounded energy preferences do not have the optimality-
is-regular property, as shown in Example 36 below.
Example 36. Consider the game depicted in Figure 5. The protagonist controls the diamond
vertex, the opponent the circle vertices. Energy deltas are denoted on the edges.
Claim: There is no finite automaton that decides whether the strategy of the protagonist
that goes right straight-away on reaching diamond is optimal after some history in the energy
game.
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Figure 5: The graph for Example 36
Proof. This strategy is optimal provided that the current energy level is not equal to the least
energy level ever reached. In that case, taking the self-loop at the diamond vertex once and
then going right would be preferable. But deciding whether the current energy level is equal
to the least energy level essentially requires counting, and can thus not be done by a finite
automaton.
In [2], two versions of bounded energy conditions were investigated: Either any energy gained
in excess of the upper bound is just lost (as in e.g. recharging a battery), or gaining energy in
excess of the bound leads to a loss of the protagonist (as in e.g. refilling a fuel tank without
automatic spill-over prevention). We are only concerned with the former, and define our multi-
player multi-outcome version as follows:
Definition 37. A multi-player multi-outcome energy parity game (MMEP game) is a game
where each color is a tuple of ordered pairs in Z×N, one pair for each player. The first (second)
component of a pair is called an energy delta (a priority), noted δav (π
a
v ).
The preferences are described as follows. Each player a has an upper energy bound Eamax ∈ N.
The cumulative energy values Ean for player a in a run ρ = v0v1 . . . are defined by E
a
0 :=
min(Eamax, δ
a
v0
) and Ean+1 := min{E
a
max, E
a
n+ δ
a
vn+1
}. Player a only cares about the least priority
occurring infinitely many times together with Ea = minn∈NEan. He has some strict weak order
≺a on such pairs, which must respect E < E
′ ⇒ (π,E′) ⊀a (π,E).
The threshold games arising from MMEP games are the disjunctive bounded-energy parity
games, which we define next:
Definition 38. A disjunctive bounded-energy parity game is a two-player win/lose game where
colors are ordered pairs in Z× N.
The winning condition is defined as follows. Let Emax ∈ N. The cumulative energy values En
in a run ρ = v0v1 . . . are defined by E0 := min(Emax, δv0) and En+1 := min{Emax, En + δvn+1}.
Given a run ρ = v0v1 . . ., we consider two values: The least priority π occurring infinitely
many times, and the least cumulative energy value reached, E = minn∈NEn. The winning
condition is given by some family (Eimin, Pi)i∈I of energy thresholds and sets of priorities. Player
1 wins iff there is some i ∈ I with E > Eimin and π ∈ Pi. We will write Bmin = mini∈I E
i
min.
The usual bounded-energy parity games are the special case where |I| = 1 (one can then
of course easily rearrange the priorities such that the ones in Pi are even, and the others odd).
Some remarks on the relevance of disjunctions of winning conditions follow below on Page 23.
Theorem 39. Disjunctive bounded-energy parity games are finite-memory determined, and
log |Emax −Bmin| bits of memory suffices for Player 1, and 2 log |Emax −Bmin| bits for Player 2.
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Proof. We take the product of V with the set Q := {Bmin, . . . , Emax}×{Bmin, . . . , Emax}, where
there is an edge from (v, e0, e1) to (u, e
′
0, e
′
1) iff there an edge from v to u in the original graph,
e′0 := min{Emax,max{Bmin, e0 + δv}} and e
′
1 = min{e1, e
′
0}. Essentially, we keep track of both
the current energy level and of the least energy level ever encountered as part of the vertices.
Note that there never can be an edge from some (v, e0, e1) to (u, e
′
0, e
′
1) where e
′
1 > e1.
Let Tk := {π | ∃i π ∈ Pi ∧ E
i
min ≤ Bmin + k}. Now we first consider the subgraph induced
by the vertices of the form (v, e0, Bmin); and then the parity game played on this subgraph with
winning priorities T0. As parity games admit positional strategies that win from every possible
vertex, we can fix such strategies for both players on the subgraph. Let A00 be the set of vertices
in this subgraph where Player 1 wins, and let B00 be the set of vertices in this subgraph where
Player 2 wins.
We proceed by a reachability analysis: Let Ai+10 be A
i
0 together with all vertices controlled
by Player 1 that have an outgoing edge into Ai0, and all vertices controlled by Player 2 where all
outgoing edges go into Ai0. We extend the positional strategies of the players to A
i+1
0 by letting
Player 1 pick some witnessing outgoing edge, and Player 2 some arbitrary edge. Likewise, we
define Bi+10 be B
i
0 together with all vertices controlled by Player 1 where all going edges go into
Bi0, and all vertices controlled by Player 2 with some outgoing edge into B
i
0, and extend the
strategies analogously.
It remains to define the strategies in the subgraph induced by V \ (A
|V |
0 ∪ B
|V |
0 ). In the
next stage, we consider the subgraph of this subgraph induced by the vertices of the form
(v, e0, Bmin+1), and again consider a parity game played there, this time with winning priorities
in T1, and so on.
Iterating the parity-game and reachability analysis steps will yield positional optimal strate-
gies for both players on the whole expanded graph.
Now consider the winning sets and strategies of both players: If Player 1 wins from some
vertex (v, e0, e1), then he also wins from any (v, e0, e
′
1) where e1 < e
′
1 – for the only difference is
the lowest energy level ever reached, which can only benefit, but not harm, Player 1. Moreover,
as (v, e0, e
′
1) cannot be reached from (v, e0, e1) at all, Player 1 can safely play the same vertex
u in the original graph at (v, e0, e
′
1) as he plays at (v, e0, e1). For fixed v, e0, let e1 be minimal
such that Player 1 wins from (v, e0, e1). Then we can change his strategy such that he plays the
same vertex in the underlying graph from any (v, e0, e
′
1).(
5)
By using log |Emax − Bmin| bits of memory, Player 1 can play his positional strategy from
above in the original game. Likewise, Player 2 can play her positional strategy from the expanded
graph in the original game using 2 log |Emax −Bmin| bits of memory.
We need one last simple lemma, and then will be able to apply Theorem 12 to energy parity
games.
Lemma 40. The valuation-preference combinations in MMEP games are automatic-piecewise
prefix-independent with at most nE2 pieces, where n is the size of the graph and E is the
maximum difference between the energy maximum and the energy minimum for some player.
Proof. The pieces are defined by the current vertex, the current energy level, and the least ever
energy level, i.e. the values Ean and minj≤nEan. As energy is bounded, both enrgy levels can
5This trick does not work for Player 2, because we would need to consider the maximal e1 where she wins
(instead of the minimal one for Player 1), but then the backward induction from the middle of the proof goes in
the ”wrong direction”.
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easily be computed by a finite automaton. If h and h′ end with the same vertex and share the
same current energy level and least energy level, then the least energy level reached in hp is
equal to the least energy level reached in h′p. As the least priority seen infinitely many times
depends only on the tail, but never on the finite prefix, we see that for h and h′ being the same
piece, hp and h′p are interchangeable for the player.
Corollary 41. All multiplayer multioutcome energy parity games have Nash equilibria in finite
memory strategies. Let A be the set of players, n the size of the graph and let E be the
maximum difference between the energy maximum and the energy minimum for some player.
Then 2|A|E2n logE2n+ 1 bits of memory suffice.
Proof. By Theorem 39 and Lemma 40 the prerequisites of Theorem 12 are given. The Mont
condition is trivially true, as there are no infinite ascending chains in the preferences. From
Theorem 39 we see that the parameter T in Theorem 12 can be chosen as 2 logE. By Lemma
40 we can chose D = logE2n and k = E2n. First note that the claim holds for n = 1 or
E = 1 (by positional determinacy of parity games). Second, for 2 ≤ n and 2 ≤ E we have
log nE2 ≤ nE2 log n, so straightforward calculus shows the general claim.
Algorithmic considerations
The proof of Theorem 39 immediately gives rise to an algorithm computing the winning strategies
in disjunctive bounded-energy parity game while using an oracle for winning strategies in parity
games. Using e.g. the algorithm for solving parity games from [14], which has a runtime of
nO(
√
n), we obtain a runtime of (nE)O(
√
nE), if we set E := |Emax − Bmin|. Unfortunately, only
the binary representation of E will need to be present in the input – E itself can easily be
exponential in the size of the input.
If we assume W to be fixed6, we arrive at a Cook reduction of solving disjunctive bounded-
energy parity games to solving parity games. This in particular implies that the decision problem
for disjunctive bounded-energy parity games with bounded weights is in P(UP∩co-UP).
Disjunctions of winning conditions
Parity and Muller conditions are easily seen to be closed under conjunction and disjunction,
as these just correspond to intersection and union respectively of the relevant sets of winning
priorities, or sets of winning sets of vertices visited infinitely many often. As long as just a
single notion of energy (or respectively payoff) is available, likewise energy, mean-payoff and
discounted payoff conditions are closed under conjunction and disjunction, as here these logical
connectives just correspond to minimum and maximum on the threshold values. Subsequently,
despite the high relevance of boolean operations on winning conditions, it is unsurprising that
they have received little attention in the literature so far.
For energy parity conditions, which are themselves a conjunction of parity and energy con-
ditions, the considerations above immediately imply closure under conjunction. The disjunction
of two energy parity conditions, however, is not necessarily equivalent to an energy parity con-
dition. In fact, we even see a qualitative difference with respect to the memory requirements
for Player 2: It was shown by Chatterjee and Doyen that in an (unbounded) energy parity
6Which is poly-time equivalent to W being given in unary.
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Figure 6: The graph for the game in Example 42
game, if Player 2 has a winning strategy, she has a positional one. This translates directly to
the corresponding result for bounded energy parity games. For disjunctive energy parity games,
Player 2 might require memory to win though:
Example 42. In the energy parity game depicted in Figure 6, Player 2 controls all vertices.
Player 1 wins with any priority, if the energy stays above 5, and wins with priority 0 if the
energy stays above 0. Each vertex is marked with π/δ, where π is the priority and δ the energy
delta.
Any positional strategy of Player 2 is winning for Player 1, but by e.g. alternating the sole
choice she has, Player 2 can win using one bit of memory.
6.2 Lexicographic product of Mean-payoff and reachability
In our second example, each player has both a mean-payoff goal and a reachability objective.
Maximizing the mean-payoff, however, takes precedence, and the reachability objective only
becomes relevant as a tie-breaker; i.e. we consider the lexicographic combination of the mean-
payoff preferences with the reachability objective. These preferences are of particular interest
as they cannot be expressed via a payoff function7, hence are an example for why considering
preferences instead of payoff functions is useful.
Proposition 43. The lexicographic product of mean-payoff preferences and a reachability ob-
jective cannot be expressed as a payoff function.
Proof. It is straight-forward to construct an example of a game where any mean payoff in [0, 1]
in any combination with reaching or not reaching the reachability objective is realizable. If
there were an equivalent payoff function for this game, it would induce an order embedding ι of
[0, 1] ×lex {0, 1} into R. As (x, 0) ≺ (x, 1) for any x ∈ [0, 1], we would find that ι(x, 0) < ι(x, 1).
Thus, there has to be some rational qx with ι(x, 0) < qx < ι(x, 1). Moreover, as (x, 1) ≺ (y, 0)
for x < y, we find that qx 6= qy for x 6= y. But then x 7→ qx would be an injection from [0, 1] to
Q, which cannot exist for reasons of cardinality.
To deal with lexicographic products, the following will be very useful:
Lemma 44. The weak OIR property is preserved by lexicographic products.
Proof. Let ≺1 and ≺2 have the OIR property, and let p, q ∈ C
ω∩ reg. By assumption there exist
regular sets M1, M
′
1, and M2 such that for all h ∈ H we have (h ∈ M1 ⇔ hˆ p ≺1 hˆ q) and (h ∈
M ′1 ⇔ hˆ q ≺1 hˆ p) and (h ∈M2 ⇔ hˆ p ≺2 hˆ q). So hˆ p(≺1 ×lex ≺2)hˆ q iff h ∈M1∪ (M2 \M
′
1).
7The von Neumann Morgenstern utility theorem [21] does not apply, as the continuity axiom is not satisfied.
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By Proposition 29, it only remains to show that the induced threshold games are uniformly
finite-memory determined. We show a slightly stronger result:
Lemma 45. In the threshold games where the preferences are the lexicographic product of
mean-payoff and reachability, either Player 1 has a winning strategy using one bit of memory,
or Player 2 has a positional winning strategy.
Proof. If the threshold is of the form (x, 1), then the reachability component is irrelevant, and
the game is equivalent to the threshold game of a mean-payoff game. As these are positionally
determined, the claim is immediate.
If the threshold is of the form (x, 0), then Player 1 has two ways of winning: Either get
mean-payoff strictly more than x, or reach the target set and obtain a mean-payoff of at least
x. We can consider for each vertex the value of the mean-payoff game starting there. Player
1 has a positional strategy that obtains more than x mean-payoff from all vertices where this
is possible, and this strategy ensures that this region is never left. If this region includes the
starting vertex, we are done. Otherwise, note that Player 1 cannot enter this region from the
outside, and Player 2 has no incentive to ever enter this region from the outside. Thus, we can
restrict our attention to the game played on the induced subgraph on the complement.
In the remaining game, we consider those vertices in the target set where the mean-payoff
obtainable is x. From all vertices where Player 1 can force the play to reach one of these, he
can win with a strategy using a single bit of memory: Play towards such a vertex in a positional
way, then flip the bit and follow a positional strategy ensuring mean-payoff at least x. Again,
if the starting vertex is covered, we are done. Else, note that Player 1 cannot reach the region
from the outside, and Player 2 has no incentive to.
In the game remaining after the second step, we again compute the obtainable mean-payoff
values. Player 2’s refusal to enter the region in round 2 might increase the mean-payoff Player 1
can obtain above x, and thus let him win after all. In any case, if both players follow positional
optimal strategies for mean-payoff games in the remaining part, they will win the mean-payoff
plus reachability game if they can at all.
Corollary 46. The multi-player multi-outcome games where preferences are lexicographic prod-
ucts of mean-payoff and reachability objectives have finite-memory Nash equilibria.
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